Tuesday, May 11, 2010

Who Is Calling the Shots?

It's time to think more about the logic of engagement with North Korea, to improve the lives of North Koreans and, in the case of private businesses, to make a profit; and the alternate logic of squeezing the Kim Jong Il regime until it pops, but potentially at the expense of the North Korean people alive today.

The reality is that while most experts and politicians view this as an either/or question, it doesn't have to be. Both approaches have a vital role to play. When well-coordinated, they can even create potentially productive synergy.

For example, when Saebyul Coal Mining Complex, a North Korean mining management organization, recently sealed a contract between two mines under its auspices and a Chinese enterprise, it agreed to hand over a substantial and unusual degree of discretion in affairs of personnel management, food, wages, materials and working methods to the Chinese. Anything of note for the running of the mines, basically.

Accordingly, and you won't need to sit down for this, the productivity of the mines has drastically improved. Needless to say, so have profits. Better yet, the Party committee at the mine has apparently been scaled back, so it presumably has less manpower to employ in making business more difficult, profits less, workers unhappy and the future grimmer.

And profitability is not the only winner;

The source noted, “North Korean workers are delighted with this method of collaboration. They get guaranteed wages and food, and the working environment has also improved thanks to new, stronger mining timbers, so productivity has increase.”

In the cafeterias at the mines, they serve 900g of rice to everyone, and pork and eggs, which workers like. According to the source, “Workers want to take meals served in the cafeteria home for their family members. In this worker-friendly mood, Party cadres are unable to complain.”


A while ago, an anonymous, prominent American expert told me that he had it on good authority that the Obama administration had told the Chinese to keep investing in the northern provinces of North Korea regardless of the rhetoric coming out of Washington. Every deal I see like this makes it more and more likely that this is the case.

It would not help for the U.S. to admit to such a conversation publicly, of course, since that would make the North Koreans leery and reduce Chinese leverage, not to mention making the U.S. appear somewhat two-faced. However, that it happened makes a lot of sense; after all, such investments are pretty clear violations of sanctions, but are never questioned publicly by anyone.

And what effect are they having? If this one is anything to go by, they are making lives better in small pockets of North Korea, and, just like the jangmadang they are wrestling control of the people's lives away from the state.

Furthermore, they are developing areas of north and northeastern North Korea which are pretty low down the list of priorities in Pyongyang's own development plans. This is taking a measure of economic strength away from the Pyongyang region and placing it in the hands of traditionally less developed areas along the border which, if it continues, will make those areas harder to police and control. People will have more money, hopefully they will have food in their bellies, and they will know all too well what life in China must be like. There is nothing about that not to like.

It should not be forgotten, then, that some part of the reason why North Korea is being forced to accept Chinese investments on Chinese terms like this is doubtless because UN and U.S. Treasury sanctions are having an effect on North Korean access to "normal" sources of funding. It's the good cop, bad cop routine.

So, from that perspective maybe we should let Hu Jintao do the diplomatic dance with Kim in Beijing, for if he is building confidence so the Kim regime will let Chinese businesses push harder and harder bargains with the North Koreans inside the country, that might not be such a bad outcome.

Friday, May 7, 2010

There Are Good Ways to Fight, and...

According to an assembled group of North Korean defectors, Kim Jong Il is unquestionably to blame for the Cheonan sinking;

Defector NGOs gathered their members in front of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense on Friday morning to assert with one voice that the Cheonan tragedy was the work of North Korea.

The NGOs made a joint statement at the protest, “Kim Jong Il, Do Not Behave So Outrageously!” Reading the statement, Kim Young Soon of the Committee for Democratization of North Korea and herself a former Yoduk Camp prisoner said, “We know intuitively that it was a cruel act by Kim Jong Il,” adding, “Is there anyone who would carry out such a dirty move besides Kim Jong Il?”

In the joint statement, she explained what leading defectors believe were the causes of the Cheonan incident, “As the people got angrier about the failed currency redenomination, Kim Jong Il tried to create fear of war among the people, thus strengthening his control.”

The defectors additionally pointed the finger at pro-North Korean activists in the South, asserting that they share responsibility “for the victims of the Cheonan and the starvation of millions of people.”

Park Sang Hak, president of the Free North Korea Movement, said, “From May 10th, we will send balloons to North Korea containing leaflets entitled, ‘Warriors of the Cheonan, South Korea Will Avenge You!’ If the direction of the wind is right, we will send balloons every day.”

Other participating defector organizations at the event were the Committee for Democratization of North Korea, Free North Korea Broadcasting, Democracy Network against North Korean Gulag, North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, and North Korea Reform Broadcasting.


It seems fair to say that the majority of people are now prepared to lay the blame for the sinking at North Korea's door, with the exception of Kim Jong Il's tragi-comic pseudo-academic mouthpiece Kim Myong Chol, who recently spent a goodly amount of time trying to pursuade the readers of this Asia Times piece that the Cheonan was sunk by American friendly fire.

It is also fair to say that South Korea, with or without the cooperation of the international community, is within its rights to put in place whatever countermeasures it sees fit in response to this criminal act.

It is also fair to say that the sending of leaflets into North Korea is a justifiable activity. Whether or not it has any great effect on the North Korean people is a different story; one presumes that soldiers guarding the border regions are affected by it on some level, but one also suspects there are more effective outlets for the time and effort of anti-Kim Jong Il groups overall.

In any case, none of that is the issue. What is the issue is the sending of a leaflet proclaiming, "Warriors of the Cheonan, South Korea Will Avenge You!"

What possible benefit could such a confrontational title hope to have? The average North Korean, who has precisely no influence over the activities of his or her government, and who is only fractionally likely to know anything about the Cheonan sinking in any case, and who, if he or she knows anything at all, is likely to have heard that it was heroic revenge for the damage to a North Korean naval vessel in the Battle of Daecheong last November, picks up the leaflet... and?

There is so much of importance that could be contained in these leaflets, so I hope that behind such a confrontational headline there are some very carefully contemplated contents.

Thursday, May 6, 2010

Playing in the Traffic

Diplomacy routinely seems like an exercise in saying nothing of substance in as roundabout a way as possible. Nowhere is this truer than in a U.S. State Department press briefing. Not because the U.S. is prone to an excess of diplomatic doublespeak, but because, for better or worse, the U.S. has interests in so many places and has to operate in concert with so many partners.

It is the very distance between the interests of the partner and the interests of the U.S. that leads to the greatest degree of question avoidance, it appears. This diplomatic dance would be funny, were it not for the fact that it has real life implications.

Look at yesterday’s departmental press briefing. Spokesman Philip Crowley was presented with two blunt questions about whether the U.S. is going to deal with the Cheonan tragedy and the return of North Korea to the Six-Party Talks separately, as two unconnected events which should not influence each other, or whether it plans to hinge the future of the Six-Party Talks on the results of the ongoing Cheonan investigation.

It is not that the U.S. and South Korea are on different paths with regards to timing; indeed, it seems clear from this that the U.S. would want to wait for the Cheonan investigation results before saying anything on the Six-Party Talks even if Kim Jong Il were to trumpet North Korea’s return to the Talks from the top of the Juche Tower.

The real difference, however, is this;


QUESTION: Follow-up. You said on this podium yesterday you hope that North Korea will come back to the Six-Party Talks. It means if Kim Jong Il in Beijing right now makes the decision and says they will come back to the Six-Party Talks, you take part in Six-Party Talks?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, there are a couple of ifs there. Let’s see, but, I mean, we are, there are things that North Korea has to do if this process is going to move forward. And its behavior, living up to its obligations, meeting its commitments that it’s made over a number of years; those are things that North Korea has to do. And let’s see what they’re prepared to do.



Note that he didn't mention the Cheonan investigation, he only mentioned extant obligations, meaning already signed denuclearization agreements. Yes the U.S. will wait for the results of the Cheonan investigation, but it doesn't seem that the results will actually matter. The reason, of course, is that the U.S. has greater interest in denuclearization than it does in the Cheonan disaster, while South Korea cares more about the probable deaths of 46 of its conscripts at the hands of North Korea than it does, in the short term at least, about the (still largely hypothetical) risk of nuclear Armageddon on the Korean peninsula.

Neither party is wrong in this, and neither party is right. It's national interest at work. What is true, though, is that North Korea has been playing in the gaps between the policies of each interested party to the inter-Korean dispute for more years than many people can remember, and it only benefits one: North Korea.

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

Going against the Grain

In stark contrast with most North Korea watchers, Alexandre Mansourov believes that Pyongyang’s economic policies since the currency redenomination of November, 2009 have not been the arbitrary, ad hoc responses to negative outcomes from earlier policy decisions that they have looked very much like.

Mansourov, writing on the new SAIS blog 38 North, says he believes that North Korea is engaged in a "longer term development strategy".

Pyongyang's aims, he explains at length and with no obvious signs of pessimism, are to “displace imports, restore self-reliance, and consolidate state control over the economic system at the expense of the newly emerging proto-markets in retail trade and the small private merchant class.”

As a result, he believes North Korea is likely to hereafter pursue a policy of increasing protectionism and a return to state leadership of the economy in an effort to “further control demand, regulate the supply of imported goods through selective protectionist tariff measures, raise funds for new infrastructure and facility investment, and boost the supply of domestically manufactured goods.”

Mansourov, to be fair, is unsure of how the new policy will work out, whether what he calls the “new equilibrium” will actually “bring about economic growth and contribute to increasing production, trade, and consumption,” or end up in “economic failure causing social chaos and political instability,” but is sure the western media is wrong to presume failure so soon.

Do I lay much stock in this analysis? No, not by any means. The currency redenomination was confiscatory, and could not possibly have led to any other outcome besides hyperinflation in the short term. Its aim was primarily to bring the markets to heel, a desired side effect in Mansourov's analysis, rather than the main ambition. In any case, it was an aim in which Pyongyang was largely unsuccessful, not least since the state was in no fit state to step into the breech and provide for the people for more than a month or two.

In addition to which, how can North Korea hope to "raise funds for new infrastructure and facility investment, and boost the supply of domestically manufactured goods"? There is nothing to tax domestically, and import substitution development is extremely hard when you have just stolen the assets of the emerging middle class! Kim's effort to claw privately held foreign currency into the state's coffers was also obviously doomed from the start, since even North Korea couldn't bring to bear the degree of repression necessary to get people to volunteer their savings to the state.

I am not alone in my opinion. Other experts, first but not only Marcus Noland, agree that the aim of the North Korean policy may indeed be to build back up a statist model of economic development, but also believe that the policy is almost certain to fail, and is, damningly, "unlikely to even contribute significantly to the stated goal of rebuilding socialism.”

By drastically reducing the amount of money in circulation at the time of the redenomination, the Noland report pointed out in January that the redenomination has had the singularly unhelpful effect of increasing the risks associated with market activity, adding fuel to the trend towards holding cash in foreign currency rather than won.

This is destined to actually circumscribe the state’s capacity to do what it is aiming to do, namely create a strong and prosperous state. At the end of the day, the market is the only way besides trade in natural resources for anyone in North Korea to generate wealth. Without wealth, and the taxation of that wealth, how can one possibly hope to develop the state? It's a Catch-22.

In short, it seems wildly implausible that the state is engaged in a "long term development strategy," or at least not one with any hope of success.

And, as an aside, what can we say about the execution of the "author" of the strategy, Park Nam Ki? Does this suggest a long term development strategy? If Kim Jong Il is casting around for scapegoats and going cap in hand to China, that is not a good sign, I'd say.