On Friday March 30th, I headed over to Yonsei University in Seoul to see Professor John Delury. On North Korean issues Delury is a progressive proponent of constructive engagement, and on this particular day he had just published a piece in Foreign Policy with Moon Chung In called 'The Land of Lesser Evils'. The piece was itself similar to a piece published by the two in the Korea Times on the 25th of last month, 'Obama's Options for Koreas'. There is not much to choose between the two, with the possible exception of the title, a battle that Foreign Policy wins hands down.
Anyhow, Delury and Moon want to see the Obama administration send an envoy to Pyongyang immediately to talk to North Korea. Not to get the Kim Jong Eun regime to cancel the launch, it appears, since Delury told me that he agrees with Destination Pyongyang's view that this is probably impossible, but to make sure that it doesn't derail all progress and ensure that the U.S. can get something out of the current undesirable situation.
Do I agree with Professor Delury? In part, yes. I think an envoy is untenable in the current domestic U.S. environment, but in and of itself is not a bad idea. Either way, to coincide with the release of my interview article on Daily NK here, below is a transcript of the most interesting parts of the Delury-Green interview-cum-debate;
Destination Pyongyang: The main thrust of your recent op-eds with
Moon Chung In seems to be that an envoy should be sent to Pyongyang prior to
the rocket launch; however, just so we are all starting from the same
jumping-off point, would you please outline your overall thesis.
John Delury: I would say that the sending of an envoy is
the action we think should be taken to change the dynamics. At the moment there
is a common description of what is likely to unfold here, and it’s really a
replay of 2009. We are not the only ones saying this; Chris Green is trying to
find other ways; Andray Abrahamian is also thinking about how to prevent it,
Scott Snyder… he wrote it up on CFR and at The Diplomat, I think.
DP: Ah, so Scott Snyder declared the launch
package idea he premiered at Asan Research Institute last week to be a sensible
one and ran with it a little way did he?
JD: Yes. And that has got parallels with what
Moon Chung In and I are saying, although there are some important differences;
Scott has a much stronger stick there; he mentioned blowing things up…
DP: I think the phrase was, “Take things off
the launch pad.”
JD: Right. However, I understand what he is
doing, and although his idea is different to ours I see them as sister projects
because he is proposing some very proactive engagement diplomacy; simply, his
is backed by even stronger action than is currently being considered. Anyway,
it runs parallel with ours in that it is trying to avoid the default ‘disengagement’
that is going on now. In conclusion, there is a small group of us who are
trying to prevent the obvious path that this is currently following.
Behind our proposal lies an assessment of why
the reversal from the Leap Day Deal to the satellite announcement happened. We
focus on the context of what is likely to be the domestic debate in North Korea
right now; I mean, Kim Jong Il has just died,
it is only the second time that the state has lost its paramount leader in six
decades, more than 60 years, so this is a pretty extraordinary moment in terms
of their domestic politics. Our model of North Korea includes differences of opinion
and different interests, vested interests. We can broadly say that some are
reformist and inclined towards opening, while others are basically isolationist
and happy with the isolation, not wanting
things to work out internationally. We see it as a dynamic situation; we
disagree with the idea of a monolithic puppet master where everyone is unified,
there’s one game plan and apparent reversals are being orchestrated to trick
everyone else.
DP: Did you buy into it that monolithic North
Korea concept when Kim Jong Il was still alive?
JD: No. I think we can argue for a
progressively decreasing scale of authority, from the peak of the Kim Il Sung
era with his personal authority, charisma and incredible history of knowing
what everyone did and having everyone in their place, all the way down to the
weakened system we see now. I don’t think Kim Jong Il ever woke up and said, “OK,
here is what we’re going to do, now everyone go and do it” either, there were
already those different interests and there was internal competition then, too.
If we did the historical work we could probably find splits even in Kim Il Sung’s
era.
DP: We may learn more about that further down
the road.
JD: Right. Anyway, the argument is not that this
is new and suddenly the case now that Kim Jong Il has died.
I think the other key characteristic of our
analysis is that these different groups are all seeing different things,
arguing different ideas and seeing what works, but the outcome depends in great measure on the response
externally. This is especially true for those who are proponents of opening,
moderating and normalizing relations. If these people don’t get usable responses
externally then they have no argument back in Pyongyang. They constantly have
to sell it, going up against people who are skeptical or don’t want it to work
because of their interests or history or whatever other factor it may be. So,
that is the context in which we read the satellite launch; we see it as one of
the less provocative, bellicose, aggressive things that North Korea could have
done under the circumstances.
DP: But you suggest one possible alternative
North Korean course of action as being a battle in the West Sea. This, I would
argue, wouldn’t have the same gravitas as the rocket. Indeed, it would be an
accident of sorts, and while it could be marketed as a great defense or
something along the lines of “we sent them running with their tail between
their legs,” it couldn’t be marketed as being something the North intended to
happen. So it doesn’t make sense to me.
JD: That’s a good point; maybe a better example
alternative would have been a ‘demonstration of military might in a more
explicitly military way’. The thing about the satellite is that it really emphasizes
peaceful use of technology. The North Koreans want to show off their prowess,
they want to show off how modern they are, and they need something big that
they can get foreign journalists to cover and can show to their people to say, “Wow,
look at us, this is incredible,” but they are doing it through a peaceful
mechanism. They could just do a long-range ballistic missile launch or
something else military; new, massive exercises on air, sea and land, for
example. Of course we may see that on April 25th, especially if
things keep going as they are. So, I take your point, but I stand by the idea
that they could have decided to use some other powerful demonstration of a more
explicitly military nature.
DP: Such a thing wouldn’t fit into a grey
area of any kind, either, of course.
JD: Right, exactly.
DP: They are obviously pitching to a grey
area.
JD: This got dropped from the Foreign Policy
piece, but what we see in the bigger picture is that they are trying to make a
transition to both security and prosperity, and it is a very difficult
transition for them. Therefore,they are going to need a lot of handholding.
This satellite launch is one of the times when they basically need their hands
held. There are different ways to do this; you can hold their hand in such a
way that you, as the USA, say, “Look, we can’t handle you doing this so we will
do it for you.” Or you can suck it up but say, “This is really bad form, you
cannot go around doing deals then turn around and find a grey area and make us
look bad if you really want a new relationship.”You can really lay down the law,
but get some other stuff through your envoy in Pyongyang in return. At the end
of the day, you can say, “We are not going to clap for your launch but we’re not
going to let it kill everything, we are going to keep moving.” That is a form
of handholding too, and a very different strategy to that which the
administration seems to be pursuing.
DP: My argument is that you should do nothing.
I think the launch is guaranteed to happen, so we would be wise to do nothing,
because if you send an envoy and they launch the thing anyway it constrains
your options later, since domestically people get angry that you’ve sent an
envoy and he has come back empty-handed. He’s messed it up, it’s all over, and you’ve
got nothing. Conversely, you say send the envoy before the launch. It seems
risky.
JD: Yeah, it is riskier, it is more aggressive.
I like do nothing, and I think it makes sense as a sister proposal, but I
suppose the reason I would stick with what we are suggesting is that I think
passivity is a big source of the problem here. I want to see the Obama
administration get hungry and get in there to deal with these guys and build
relationships; especially now when things are in a bit of flux on their side.
This is when you want to be in there, figuring out the players, working out
what can and can’t be done and what they want and where they are going to screw
you.
I think “do nothing” would be a good
fallback plan, but I’d still rather see a more proactive strategy. First of
all, you don’t have to tell them that much about why you are sending them the envoy;
just send in this high-powered person. I like Colin Powell for the job; it’d be
like the Perry Process. I want to see a Powell Process.
DP: Henry Kissinger? Is he too old?
JD: I don’t like him; I like Powell. But as you
say, we need to be careful about expectations, so we must not set it up as
sending an envoy to get the launch cancelled. Simply get in there and
negotiate. There may still be room to get it cancelled, although I agree that
it looks very unlikely. However, the advantage of sending someone now is that
you can get them to promise something you want in return for doing what Chris
Green wants, which is nothing.
Conversely, if you just wait then you get
nothing out of their launch. But if you send someone in and the North is
nervous and excited about the visit and wants it to be a good one, then they
are under some pressure to deliver. At the end of the day, if you can say, “I
have instructions that allow us to do nothing about this launch but here is
what we expect in return” then that is a good position to be in. Unfortunately,
politically we are both running out of time, and in the current situation,
after all the criticism that has already been issued, doing nothing seems
harder than sending someone senior to Pyongyang.
DP: I suspect you might be right.
JD: The problem is that the approach seems to
be that whenever North Korea does anything you don’t like or find objectionable
in any area, particularly on the nuclear issue, then you just cancel everything
else.
DP: And go all the way back to square one.
JD: Right. Our view is the complete opposite; you
have to keep as many things going as you can, and when you have a problem try
to contain that problem and deal with it. If you can’t solve it then maybe get
something somewhere else for it. On the launch; if you cannot cancel it, then
make sure you get something elsewhere in exchange for allowing it. Keep up the
full court press of engagement.
Sports metaphors can be helpful, right? How
many times has the administration used the metaphor, “The ball’s in your court”?
This is like trying to play a game of tennis where you hit the ball but the
other side doesn’t want to hit it back so you just sit there going, “Come on,
come on, come on, it’s in your court, it’s in your court,” while they are
saying, “Actually, it is in your court, the ball is behind you.” In reality
there’s a ball behind each player and they are just sat there yelling at each
other.
So maybe a soccer metaphor would be better.
The ball is in play, so let’s maintain possession to keep pressuring the North Korean
opposition, keep pushing. You see, we need to understand that all these
different forms of engagement, from the mill-to-mill Pentagon stuff, various
kinds of economic things that take a minimalist approach to sanctions, cultural
exchanges, the food assistance; all these are pressuring the North Korean
system; they are not rewarding it. These things are hard for their system to
take, and tend to generate a lot of resistance. If you’ve been to North Korea
or worked with North Koreans you can understand this; it’s frustrating and
difficult for them too, they are pulling their hair out trying to work with
Americans. There is a massive gap here, and closing it is stressful,
threatening and destabilizing. So you have to want it, be committed, hold their
hand the whole time and not look to cut it off the minute they do something you
disagree with. Do the opposite, in fact. Just keep working it.
DP: My favored metaphor is also soccer
related. Maybe soccer is the way forward. Either way; do you support a return
to the Sunshine Policy?
JD: I think the key thing is that it needs to be
Sunshine 2.0.
DP: Which is?
JD: I don’t know. But I am hoping that there
are some much more informed and smarter South Koreans than I who are coming up
with it. Certainly, if it is a choice between the Sunshine Policy and this
administration’s policy then yes, I support the Sunshine Policy. But I think
the critical thing is the 2.0 part. You have to learn lessons and have to be
self-critical, ask yourself what were the weaknesses first time around and what
has changed. You can’t just go right back to what you were doing before. The
basic spirit was right, but too much has changed and modifications are needed.
DP: I recently met an influential figure in
the Sunshine Policy the first time around, and he said that he thought the
process had been over-politicized. He said President Kim Dae Jung
over-politicized it and went to Pyongyang too early. He said he advised Kim to
sit tight and let the next president go, but he went too early because he was
too keen to be the first to go. He thinks the fungible nature of the assistance
was not the biggest problem, which I take issue with because the North
developed nuclear weapons off the back of all this sunshine, but regardless he
believes it was mostly political.
Anyway, the Snyder proposal includes a launch
package offer for the North. Does it have any legs?
JD: I think in the short term probably not, but
in the medium term perhaps yes. If you look back, that was one of the key
points on offer when Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang in 2000. The U.S.
doesn’t want North Korea doing anything from the ground up into space, but once
North Korea is in space then Washington is fine with it. I think it could be
something concrete to bring to the table for these negotiations we are
proposing. However, the likelihood of doing it to stop the current launch is
incredibly small.
DP: When I heard Scott Snyder’s suggestion it
immediately struck me as a non-starter, and this was because when you’re
reading Rodong Shinmun, if you are unlucky enough to have to do that for a living,
you find that they talk in terms of “with our own technology”, “in our own
way”, “this is our strength”, “look what we can do” and even, on occasion, joke
about South Korea’s launch failures, saying, “They have no right to comment on
our work since their space launches are crap and we have much more skill than
them.” So, I suspect they are never going to take the launch package offer
because it means too much domestically to go it alone. I just can’t see it.
JD: That’s part of why I agree with you over the
impending launch. There is too much pressure due to ‘Juche 100’ and the need to
do it for themselves. However, think about if the USA is launching North Korean
satellites from Florida with a big DPRK flag on the front of an American
missile in the long term! You also read enough Rodong Shinmun and know enough
about North Korean ideology to realize that there is this weird exception to
the rule; when the USA and DPRK flag go up together, be it for a symphony
orchestra or whatever, then that is a moment of incredible pride for them.
DP: The idea that “they came to bow to us”?
JD: Yes, partly that, but they can spin it as a
mixture of “they came to bow to us” plus “finally they are accepting us, our
strength and legitimacy, and they know we can launch a satellite but they are
afraid of us so we will let them do it for us.” I think if the United States is
launching satellites for North Korea then it will compensate ideologically for
not doing themselves.
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